Although Privatization become a worldwide circulation of political and economic circles since last century but there are still basic disagreements on the mechanisms of its implementation and of course about the way of monitoring this process. In our country, though, the privatization and in particular privatization of state-owned enterprises goes back many years ago, but the culmination of this fundamental transformation comes from the general policies of article 44 of constitution and the law implementing it, which first addressed the issue of privatization in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless success of the implementation of these policies has been in doubt for many years. This skepticism has become more pronounced, especially in relation to the corruption that has occurred in the area of divestiture and That is why the issue of overseeing oversight is important, Supervision is not just about choosing how to outsource state enterprises and In addition to discussing the preparation of firms (companies) for transfer, there is also a shadow over the post-transfer phase and Rather than merely changing the ownership of these firms, it has targeted the more fundamental goal of "increasing the private sector's share in the national economy" and ultimately accelerating the growth of the national economy.

This article has analyzed principle no.8 of the Constitution from three aspects: 1-verbal analysis 2-conceptual analysis 3-ways to execute this principle. In first section a precise definition of "call to good", "good and evil" (both in law and in jurisprudence) and "government" have been presented. In second section to have a better understanding of principle no.8, issues such as the relation between "enjoining good" and supervision, fields of enjoining good and forbidding the evil, public supervision as an obligation, generality of who enjoin good and forbid the evil, generality of whom are called to good and are forbidden from the evil, generality of instances of commanding and forbidding and tools of public supervision over the government have been discussed. Third section takes a brief look at contents of this principle and suggests that parliament should ratify the establishment of a coordinating organization as a necessary step to execute principle no.8; an organization which is in charge of policymaking, planning and supervising accurate execution of enjoining good and forbidding the evil in society.

One of the issues considered by the clergy after the victory of the revolution was the supervision of legislation, which was realized in the form of the principles of the Guardian Council in the constitution. The question of the present article is how the idea of jurists' supervision of the parliament's approvals in the form of the principles of the Guardian Council was proposed in the constitution and was approved by the council of constitutional experts. The present article, using the main sources and the conducted researches and relying on the descriptive-analytical approach, came to the conclusion that the following factors caused the current of Islamic Jurisprudence to gradually include its desired principles in the Constitution approved by the Assembly of Constitutional Experts. Incorporating the principle of jurists' supervision over the parliament's approvals in the drafts of the constitution,acceptance of the principle of jurisprudence supervision over legislation by the representatives of political currents present in the Majlis of Experts,Dominance of the representatives of the Faqahati Islamic Movement in the Assembly of Constitutional Experts,The hegemonic discourse of Islamic jurisprudence after the approval of the principle of "jurisprudence". As a result, the principles of the Guardian Council were approved by the representatives.

The relation of the constitutional review institution as an institution that guards and guarantees the implementation and application of the constitution in a democratic system (in a nation-based system as a precise meaning) with its previous procedure and precedent is one of the issues that has different forms and implications depending on the requirements of different legal models. Although different models of constitutional reviews can be considered based on various criteria, but in general, two models of written law and common law are divided into the formulation of the relationship of the constitutional review institutions with their previous procedures and precedents. Based on this, the current research is trying to use the descriptive-analytical method, while examining the mentioned issue in relation to different countries under the two models of written and common law and according to the model of the constitutional review institution in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in addition to applying the preferences and advantages of the constitutional review model. The Islamic Republic of Iran should take into account the achievements and experiences of different countries in order to improve the quality of the performance of its own model of constitutional council

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a religious democratic system whose legitimacy is governed by divine will. The nature of this system requires that its constitution be influenced by the foundations of Islamic rule and that its legislation, which expresses the rules of social management, should flow through the Qur'an and Sunnah, and that competent people should be in charge of governing and governing the country in such a way that Islamic rulings in all matters of society. And the interaction between the people and the government. Based on this necessity, in this research, using descriptive-analytical method and referring to available library resources and documents and in accordance with the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution inspired by Islam, to study the methods of monitoring and its application in the democratic system. Iran's religion At the same time, these practices monitor four types of practices, such as: intelligence monitoring, audit supervision, deductive supervision, and disciplinary supervision.

Due to the direct relationship between monitoring and controlling power and its achievement, ie preventing corruption and deviation, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the eighth principle, inspired by Islamic thought, considers the invitation to good and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil as a duty. Focusing on the area of public oversight of the government, this article seeks to answer the question by analytical method that what is the requirements of an appropriate model in relation to public oversight as a benchmark pattern. The premise of the article is that systematic, specialized and formal monitoring, although necessary, is not sufficient. The findings of the article show that in the desired model of public oversight, reviewing the law of protecting the good and serious support for the formation of organizations Institutionalization are among the requirements.

The aim of this study is to study and achieve the oversight system of Islam and the Constitution of the IRI in the field of peoplechr('39')s oversight of the government with an emphasis on the knowledge system of Nahj al-Balagheh and the articles of the IRI Constitution. This research is performed at the descriptive-analytical level with a library-based method. The authorchr('39')s studies showed that religious sources, especially Nahj al-Balaghah and also the IRI`s Constitution, consider public oversight in the Islamic political system inevitable and give it a special place and consider it as a necessary constructive and deterrent factor to protect the system from harm. And for this reason, awareness of the people and officials with the context of public oversight and fathfulness to it in practice, which introduces religious teachings and principles of the constitution as effective examples of oversight, protects society from deviations and harms.

The Article 4 of the Constitution is one of the fundamental principles of the constitution which forms the legislative foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The inclusion scope of the second clause of this Article, in addition to various laws and regulations, encompasses other Articles of the Constitution and proves the Rule of Islamic criteria on absoluteness and generality of the Articles of the Constitution. The study of existing legal documents indicates that during the forty-year history of the Constitution, such capacity is used regarding 3 Articles of the Constitution (Articles 13, 69 and 121) by the jurists of the Guardian Council. This paper, through procedural analysis of these three cases, is to assess and evaluate the capacity of this clause of the Article 4. The results of this study indicate that two of these announced Shar’ i opinions are compatible with the originalist interpretive approach and one is the product of the different juridical interpretation of the Guardian Council jurists. Implementation of the existing capacities in Article 4 in such cases may lead to transformability of the Constitution, which in a conception, in line with aims, aspirations and concerns of the main owners of the Constitution are justifiable. However, implementation of Shar’ i supervision on the fourth principle does not have per se any confrontation with stability and rigidity of the Constitution. In addition, this study will compare both “ shar’ i supervision” and “ interpretation of the Constitution” . According to the analysis, effects and positions of Shar’ i supervision and Interpretation, it can be claimed that there is close relation between two concepts, even it is possible to claim that Shar’ i supervision of the Guardian Council jurists means entering the arena of Article 98 and interpretation of Constitution.

Legislative Supervision under Articles 85 and 138 of the constitution, the President (Speaker) of the Parliament granted the approval of the Council of Ministers, along with the notification to the device must inform the Chairman of the Parliament. Significant importance in this respect is the authority of the Speaker and the decisions of the monitoring mechanism of this kind. The most important question is voiding the approval after legal deadline, if it is criticized by the Speaker and there is no amendment by the Council of Ministers? This paper attempts to explore, describe and analyze the scope and manner of monitoring is determined to be a useful step for future legislation and regulations in this field.

Extended AbstractIntroduction The encounter between Eastern nations and the modern world, particularly in the 19th century, was a pivotal event in contemporary history. During the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, the East gradually distanced itself from the modern world, especially European powers. This gap was evident in the early military and intellectual confrontations between the East and the powerful states of the international system. The Ottoman Empire, Japan, and Iran were three significant Eastern states whose political histories during this period are of particular interest. These nations experienced a crisis in the 18th and 19th centuries. Aware of the similar challenges they faced—internal weakness and external threats—the intellectual and political elites of these states sought to save their countries from decline by adapting to the new global order. Beyond their shared challenges, these elites also converged on a similar solution: reforming the political system. Constitutionalism, as a product of the modern era, was seen as a means to achieve this reform and overcome governmental weakness. The constitutional movements in the East reflected the belief among the intellectual and political elites that establishing a constitutional order and drafting a constitution could transform governance.Methodology This study argues that this historical experience merits further analysis and reinterpretation. By examining the spread of constitutional thought in Eastern countries, we can ask the following question: "How did the Iranian Constitution, particularly the Constitutional Law of Iran, differ from the constitutions of the Ottoman Empire and Japan?" This question necessitates a historical analysis of the constitutional movements in these three Eastern countries during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The underlying hypothesis of this research is that the Iranian Constitution (1906), compared to the Ottoman (1876) and Japanese (1889) constitutions, had a different perspective on the role and status of the nation. Unlike the other two constitutions, the Iranian Constitution was the first in the Eastern world to move beyond the tradition of authoritarian rule.Interpreting constitutionalism in the Eastern world necessitates employing a historical content analysis approach. This involves a critical analysis of historical events, texts, and documents to examine constitutionalism in the East. The research aims to compare constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and Iran and to identify distinctions between the Iranian constitution and the other two case studies; a historical sociological approach can be adopted. According to Dennis Smith in "The Rise of Historical Sociology," several issues are crucial in a historical sociological perspective. The first is the role of elites and intellectual or political actors in events. Second, it involves understanding events within a specific historical and temporal context, paying attention to the sequence of historical developments and the unique historical, cultural, traditional, and political context of that society. Third, it emphasizes the importance of comparing and contrasting events.Finding The theoretical framework of this research is based on John Austin's perspective. According to Austin, beyond the existence of written law, one must also consider the law's efficacy. By efficacy, Austin means that written law must have a practical impact, and political order cannot simply rely on the existence or writing of a law. The efficacy of law becomes relevant when the rights of the people or nation and the limits of government are respected. A similar perspective is found in the interpretation of constitutionalism, where it is argued that a constitutional monarchy is truly founded when the 'rights of the nation' and the 'limits of government' are clearly defined.Conclusions Numerous studies have been conducted on the ups and downs of Iran's constitutional revolution, each with its own perspective. However, this discourse argues that a deeper understanding of Iran's constitutionalism and particularly its constitution can be achieved by examining it within the broader context of the East's encounter with the modern world and by comparing it with the constitutions of other countries that underwent similar transitions to constitutionalism. Analyzing and explaining constitutionalism in the East becomes even more significant when, beyond merely describing historical developments, we examine their constitutions in terms of the relationship between the people, the monarch, and the law. The constitutionalist thought of that era expected that alongside goals such as a strong state, economic modernization, and territorial independence, the issue of national sovereignty or the primacy of the people's will in the constitution would also gain importance. This desire was one of the fundamental bases of the constitutional model of political governance in any state or nation around the world. However, the constitutions of the Ottoman Empire and Japan adopted a conservative and stingy approach regarding national sovereignty and popular rule. In fact, rather than interpreting the constitutions of these two states in terms of the place of the people's will and national sovereignty, the Ottoman and Japanese laws can be seen as a form of human rights or consideration of certain expedient rights for the subjects. In contrast, the Iranian Constitution explicitly insisted on national sovereignty and rule based on the will of the people. The Iranian Constitution was the first constitution in the Eastern world to describe governance as a trust granted by the people to the ruler. This was in stark contrast to the pre-constitutional Iran, where the Shah or Sultan was considered the shadow of God, the Qibla of the world, and the absolute owner of people and property. The distinction and virtue of the Iranian Constitution lay precisely in its termination of such a tradition.